Command Control: Lawful Versus Unlawful Application by De Giulio, Anthony P.
San Diego Law Review 
Volume 10 
Issue 1 Due Process in the Military Article 6 
12-1-1972 
Command Control: Lawful Versus Unlawful Application 
Anthony P. De Giulio 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Anthony P. De Giulio, Command Control: Lawful Versus Unlawful Application, 10 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 72 
(1972). 
Available at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr/vol10/iss1/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Digital USD. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in San Diego Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital USD. For more information, 
please contact digital@sandiego.edu. 
Command Control: Lawful Versus
Unlawful Application
ANTHONY P. DE GIULIO*
I. INTRODUCTION
What Is Command Control?
In our present society, command control of the military criminal
system is a term discussed by many, feared by some and under-
stood by few. The American public exhibits indifference to the
military justice system until there is a great influx into the service
of the draftee or so-called "citizen soldier." The problem is com-
pounded by the ignorance of the public and many military person-
nel of the functioning of the military criminal system. To the ci-
vilian, command control is an ever present evil of military society.
It is the means by which the commander insures that an accused is
summarily convicted of a crime and sentenced according to the
dictates of the commander. Unfortunately, this concept is also
held by some uninformed military personnel.
* B.A., Idaho State University, 1962; J.D., Willamette University, 1965;
Major, JAGC, U.S. Army. Admitted to practice before the Supreme Court
of Idaho, the Court of Military Review, the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho, and the United States Supreme Court. The opin-
ions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author and do not
necessarily represent the views of either the Judge Advocate General, U.S.
Army, or any other governmental agency.
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Such a misconception is understandable since command control,
most commonly expressed as "command influence," is difficult to
define.
The phrase "command contror' is vague and indefinite to those not
close to the picture.... The same commanding officer is empow-
ered to accuse the defendant, to draft and direct charges against
him, to select the prosecution and defense counsel from officers un-
der his command, to review and alter the court's decision, and to
change any sentence imposed.1
Although the complete accuracy of this statement may be ques-
tioned, it represents the general view of command control.
The commander has been empowered by Congress to perform
certain judicial functions.2 The exercise of these judicial functions
may be termed command control of the courts-martial process.
Thus it must be recognized that command control is an integral part
of our military criminal system. Only when a commander improp-
erly exercises his judicial functions and enters forbidden areas does
that control become unlawful. It is this unlawful command control
that has resulted in the public challenge to the military judicial
system.
Although command influence is the most common phrase em-
ployed to describe the commander's exercise of his judicial func-
tions, command control will be used wherever possible throughout
this article since it more accurately describes the nature of these
functions.
Criticism of Command Control
Criticism has a legitimate role in the development of any justice
system.3 In the area of command control, a commentator made the
allegation that " . . . the convening authority decides whether to
bring charges, appoints the judge, both the prosecution and defense
1. Hearings on H.R. 2498 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
Armed Forces, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 640 (1949) (statement by Richard H.
Wels, Chairman of Spec. Comm. on Military Justice of N.Y. County Law-
yers Association) [hereinafter cited as 1949 Hearings].
2. See Hansen, Judicial Functions for the Commander?, 41 Mm_. L. REv.
20 (1968).
3. Hodson, Introduction, Is there Justice in the Military?, in Ad-
ministration of Military Justice, Prepared for use at the Program of the
Criminal Law Section, A.B.A. 1 (11 Aug. 1970).
counsel, the court members and reviews the case."'4 The Code at-
tempts to prohibit the exercise of unlawful command control.5
Congress attempted to establish the means necessary to enforce
these prohibitions by providing in pertinent part:
Any person subject to this chapter who... (2) knowingly and in-
tentionally fails to enforce or comply with any provision of this
chapter regulating the proceedings before, during, or after trial of
an accused; shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.0
In the past, the military services have ignored this provision.
Judge Quinn, Chief Judge of the Court of Military Appeals, has
pointed out that although there is no reason to ignore the provision
of the Code, there are no reported cases of prosecution for unlawful
command control.7 One civilian writer expressed his opinion to
the general public as follows:
Not until 1969 was the MANUAL for COURTS-MARTIAL amended
to outlaw a military commander's giving the court members "pre-
4. Moyer, Procedural Rights of the Military Accused: Advantages over
a Civilian Defendant, 22 VIE. L. Rnv. 105 (1970).
5. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 37, 10 U.S.C. § 837 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as UCMJJ, provides:
(a) No authority convening a general, special, or summary
court-martial, nor any other commanding officer, may censure, rep-
rimand, or admonish the court or any member, military judge,
or counsel thereof, with respect to the findings or sentence ad-judged by the court, or with respect to any other exercise of its
or his functions in the conduct of the proceedings. No person
subject to this chapter may attempt to coerce or, by any unau-
thorized means, influence the action of a court-martial or any other
military tribunal or any member thereof, in reaching the findings
or sentence in any case, or the action of any convening, approving,
or reviewing authority with respect to his judicial acts. The fore-
going provisions of the subsection shall not apply with respect
to (1) general instructional or informational courses in militaryjustice if such courses are designed solely for the purpose of in-
structing members of a command in the substantive and proce-
dural aspects of courts-martial, or (2) to statements and instruc-
tions given in open court by the military judge, president of a
special court-martial, or counsel.
(b) In the preparation of effectiveness, fitness, or efficiency re-
port or any other report or document used in whole or in part for
the purpose of determining whether a member of the armed forces
is qualified to be advanced, in grade, or in determining the as-
signment of transfer of a member of the armed forces or in deter-
mining whether a member of the armed forces should be retained
on active duty, no person subject to this chapter may, in preparing
any such report (1) consider or evaluate the performance of duty
of any such member as a member of a court-martial, or (2) give a
less favorable rating or evaluation of any member of the armed
forces because of the zeal with which such member, as counsel,
represented any accused before a court-martial.
6. UCMJ art. 98, 10 U.S.C. § 898 (1970).
7. Joint Hearings on S. 749 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional
Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary and a Special Subcomm. on Armed
Services, United States Senate, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1966) [hereinafter
cited as 1966 Hearings].
[VOL. 10: 72, 1972] Command Control
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
trial orientation"-which is an euphemism for letting the court
members know which way he wants their verdicts to go. Wheth-
er or not the practice will be really outlawed is yet to be seen. A
commander who violates this can only be court-martialed, and
where is the higher officer who will hold him officially accounta-
ble for doing what virtually all officers believe a necessity...8
Referring to several instances of possible violations of Article 37,
Judge Ferguson has recommended providing for mandatory dis-
missal of any officer who attempts to pervert justice and has sug-
gested that violations of the Code constituting unlawful command
control should be punishable in federal courts under Title 18, Unit-
ed States Code.9 The failure to prosecute for unlawful command
control has not been unnoticed by Congress and has evoked the
comment that "The 1968 law contains language purporting to pro-
hibit this form of influence, but it has proven wholly unenforci-
ble.,U9
The authority of the commander to appoint the court has been
the subject of continuous criticism. Speaking for the majority of
the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Douglas stated,
... the suggestion of the possibility of influence on the actions of
the court-martial by the officer who convenes it, selects its mem-
bers and counsel on both sides, and who usually has direct com-
mand authority over its members is a pervasive one in military
law, despite strenuous efforts to eliminate the danger."
The appointment of defense counsel has been an area of criticism.
Congress has noted allegations from former Judge Advocate officers
that defense counsel who were too aggressive have been given other
duties, that in some instances defense counsel were the least ex-
perienced counsel available and as they became more experienced
were appointed the duty of prosecuting cases.12 Judge Quinn ad-
mitted to Congress that, although defense counsel does a very good
job, the most brilliant lawyers the Court of Military Appeals has
seen appear on the side of the government. 3
8. SHERBILL, MILITARY JUSTICE IS TO JUSTICE AS M=nARY MUSIC IS TO
Music, 77 (1970).
9. 1966 Hearings at 303.
10. 116 CONG. REc. 28711 (1970) (remarks of Senator Goodell).
11. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 264 (1969).
12. Joint Hearings on S. Res. 260 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional
Rights of thl Comm. on the Judiciary and a Special Subcomm. on Armed
Services, United States Senate, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962) [hereinafter
cited as 1962 Hearings].
13. Id. at 184.
The military judiciary has not escaped critical observation when
compared to federal courts.
. .. conceding to military personnel that high degree of honesty
and sense of justice which nearly all of them undoubtedly have, it
still remains true that military tribunals have not and probably
never can be constituted in such a way that they can have the same
kind of qualifications that the Constitution has deemed essential to
fair trials of civilians in Federal courts. For instance, the Consti-
tution does not provide life tenure for those performing judicial
functions in military trials. They are appointed by military com-
manders and may be removed at will. Nor does the Constitution
protect their salaries as it does judicial salaries. Strides have been
made toward making courts-martial less subject to the will of the
executive department which appoints, supervises and ultimately
controls them. But from the very nature of things, courts have
more independence in passing on the life and liberty of people
than do military tribunals.14
The convening authority's review of the case after trial has been
criticized. It is argued that since he refers the case to trial he has
already passed judgment upon the accused.1' Further, it has been
pointed out that the process of review results in severe sentences
by the court.
What is objectionable is the resulting practice whereby the court
imposes an excessively severe sentence upon the assumption that
the commanding officer who convenes the court will reduce it to an
extent that he will consider just and conducive to the maintenance
of discipline.16
The entire concept of command control has been under such seri-
ous attack as to generate the following comment concerning its
prohibition:
... the process of forbidding command influence in a hierarchial
body is a bit like the development of weapons and counterweap-
ons: No matter how good a particular weapon, there will ulti-
mately be developed an effective defense thereto, and no matter
how effective any defense, there will ultimately be found a new
weapon to overcome it.17
One public critic has presented this picture:
Courts-martial are the responsibility of the commander and so ev-
ery trial is, in a sense a test of his disciplinary policy. The com-
mander is in complete control of the machinery; he decides wheth-
er to bring charges, he appoints the court (similar to a civilian
jury), the law officer (judge), and the trial counsel (prosecution),
and the defense counsel from among his junior officers and he re-
views the sentence with power to reduce or waive it. It is a little
14. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17-18 (1955).
15. See Sherman, Military Injustice, THE NEw REPUBLIc, 9 Mar. 1968
at 21.
16. Keeffe & Moskin, Codified Military Injustice, 35 CoRNELL L.Q. 169
(1949).
17. 1966 Hearings at 314.
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like having a district attorney act as grand jury, select the judge,
both attorneys and jury from his staff, and then review the sen-
tence on appeal. The Code, in an attempt to preserve a fair trial
forbids commanders from influencing the action of a court-martial
but the possibility that a junior officer can banish the influence of
his commander (who rules him and controls his assignments) is
about as likely as a senator not being influenced by accepting large
gifts.'8
The views presented are merely a small sampling of the criticism
of command control. The fact that criticism is not always objective
or does not agree with personal viewpoint is not important. The
result of criticism led to the following comment by the Judge Advo-
cate General of the Army:
Although much of this criticism is neither objective nor construc-
tive, it cannot be ignored, because it has created a belief in the
minds of a sizable segment of our population that the system of
military justice is unfair, that a soldier loses his constitutional
rights when he puts on the uniform of his country. The military
lawyer, no less than his civilian colleague, must be ever alert to
currents of contemporary beliefs and thought, for, to exist, a system
must not only be good, but those affected by it must believe it is
good.19
Scope of Analysis
The purpose of this article is not to attempt to rebut criticism of
command control, but rather to explore limitations upon the role of
the commander in the military justice system. An examination
will be made of the commander's disciplinary policies and limita-
tions placed upon the formulation of those policies. What control
can the commander exercise over the prosecutorial discretion of
subordinate court-martial authorities? Can he control his subordi-
nates in their handling of disciplinary problems? Can he properly
reserve or withdraw court-martial authority from subordinate com-
manders as a device of command control?
An analysis will be made of the prohibition against an accuser
convening courts-martial including the tests applied by the Court
of Military Appeals. Who can convene the court when the original
convening authority is the accuser?
18. Sherman, Military Injustice, THE NEW REPuBmIc, 9 Mar. 1968 at 21.
19. Hodson, Introduction, Is There Justice in the Military?, in Admin-
istration of Military Justice, Prepared for use at the Program of the Crim-
inal Law Section, A.B.A. 1 (11 Aug. 1970).
Command control over personnel of the court will be examined.
Is the commander unfettered in detailing trial and defense counsel,
court members and the military judge? What control can be ex-
ercised over personnel after they have been detailed to a court?
An examination will be made of command control over initial re-
view of the case. A summary of proposed legislation as it relates
to command control is set forth.
Although portions of this article are academic and theoretical,
particularly the area dealing with withdrawal and reservation of
court-martial authority, it will serve as a consolidated starting
point for those confronted with problems of command control.
IL ESTABLISHING DISCIPLiNARY POLICY By COMMAND DIRECTIVES
General.
A commander's authority to establish disciplinary policy was rec-
ognized in early cases under the Code. The United States Court of
Military Appeals has pointed out that a ". . . commander has ple-
nary power over his subordinate officers regarding command func-
tions."20 Disciplinary policy is a commander's regulatory authority
for maintenance and improvement of discipline for effective fulfill-
ment of his assigned mission.21 In a case involving a Navy policy
directive, Judge Ferguson commented, "We do not condemn general
service policies and pronouncements. It is a commander's preroga-
tive to determine such policies and to promulgate them as he sees
fit. ' 22 In another case, the court stated:
... [Tlhe responsibility of a commanding officer for the mainte-
nance of discipline within his command and the proper conduct of
courts-martial cannot be questioned. In matters of discipline, fail-
ure to curb the unlawful tendencies of subordinates may demon-
strate lack of capacity to command.23
A commander is not unfettered in the formulation of the policy
directives he may issue. It is one thing for a commander to an-
nounce a general policy and yet another to use that power to in-
fluence the findings and sentence in a particular case.24 A policy
directive that tends to control directly the judicial processes rather
than merely attempting to improve the discipline of the command
20. United States v. Gray, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 615, 620, 20 C.M.R. 331, 336
(1956).
21. United States v. Hawthorne, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 293, 299, 22 C.M.R. 83, 89
(1956).
22. United States v. Estrada, 7 U.S.C.M.A 635, 638, 23 C.M.R. 99, 102
(1957).
23. United States v. Isbell, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 782, 786, 14 C.M.R. 200, 204
(1954).
24. United States v. Littrice, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 487, 13 C.M.R. 43 (1953).
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enters the realm of unlawful command control.25 A policy state-
ment cannot be made mandatory upon subordinate commanders;
it must leave them free to follow or disregard the directive in the
exercise of their judicial discretion.2 6 Although a directive may
not be mandatory by its terms, an interpretation by a commander
that it is mandatory results in unlawful command control.27 A di-
rective cannot remove a commander's judicial discretion by requir-
ing elimination of sex perverts2 8 or requiring a punitive discharge
for regular army offenders who have two or more previous convic-
tions. 29 A commander cannot attempt to influence the action of a
court on a particular case.30
On the other hand, it has been held that a superior commander
may return a matter to a subordinate commander for "appropriate
disposition under your jurisdiction."3 1  A commander's comments
at a staff and commanders' conference outlining measures to pre-
vent future incidents but insisting upon a fair trial for an accused
has been held not to constitute unlawful command control.32 A
policy directive on self-inflicted wounds calling for review of basic
principles of leadership and providing for initiation of flagging ac-
tion to insure completion of disciplinary action when a self-in-
flicted wound occurred was held a valid exercise of command re-
sponsibility; the directive also indicated that the superior com-
mander would review all cases paying particular attention to indi-
cations that leaders had not done their job properly.3 3 Although
some terms of a directive might be taken to indicate to the contrary
when read out of context, the court will consider the directive
when read as a whole to determine if the promulgating officer
strays beyond the limits of his responsibility of command.3 4
Thus, a commander may issue policy directives that do not inter-
fere with judicial processes. Attempts to control the action of a
25. United States v. Hawthorne, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 293, 22 C.M.R. 83 (1956).
26. Id.
27. United States v. Doherty, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 287, 17 C.M.R. 287 (1954).
28. Id.
29. United States v. Hawthorne, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 293, 22 C.M.R. 83 (1956).
30. United States v. Cole, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 296, 38 C.M.R. 94 (1967).
31. United States v. Ginyard, 36 C.M.R. 683, 685 (1966), rev'd on other
grounds, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 512, 37 C.M.R. 132 (1967).
32. United States v. Hurt, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 735, 27 C.M.R. 3 (1958).
33. United States v. Harrison, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 179, 41 C.M.R. 179 (1970).
34. Id.
particular court are unlawful. The test of command control over
the judicial process is not whether the directive is mandatory but
whether it is interpreted as mandatory by the subordinate com-
mander.
The Commander's Prosecutorial Discretion
1. Command Control Over Reference to an Inferior Court.
A commander's control over the court-martial system extends
through the chain of command to subordinate commanders charged
with certain responsibilities in the disposition of court-martial
charges.35 He may issue policy directives emphasizing serious dis-
ciplinary problems, but such directives become unlawful command
control when they directly tend to control judicial processes rather
than merely attempt to improve discipline within the command.30
In United States v. Hawthorne,37 an Army commander issued a
policy directive providing that, as a general rule, any charges
against a regular army soldier with two or more previous convic-
tions should be referred to a general court-martial in order that
paragraph 127, Section B, Manual for Courts-Martial, could be uti-
lized.38 The charges against the accused, a regular army soldier
with three previous convictions, were forwarded by the command-
ing officer, who, in the letter of transmittal, recommended trial by
general court-martial in view of the policy. Intermediate com-
manders concurred in the recommendation. Setting aside the con-
viction, the Court of Military Appeals held that the commander
having summary court-martial jurisdiction has substantial discre-
tion in determining whether charges should be disposed of admin-
istratively or by court-martial. The policy directive was an exer-
cise of unlawful command control since it attempted to control
judicial processes, denying the accused's immediate and intermedi-
ate commanders of their discretionary power to reach an independ-
ent decision in the disposition of the case.
In United States v. Sims,3 9 a battalion commander had referred
an AWOL case to a special court-martial. The next higher com-
35. United States v. Gordon, 33 C.M.R. 489, rev'd on other grounds, 14
U.S.C.M.A. 314, 34 C.M.R. 94 (1963).
36. Id.
37. 7 U.S.C.M.A. 293, 22 C.M.R. 83 (1956).
38. MANuAL FOR Cours-MA T U, Uxrrz STATEs, para. 127, § B (rev. ed.
1969) [hereinafter cited as MCM 1969]. The pertinent part of the Manual
authorizes a bad conduct discharge when an accused is found guilty of an
offense where no discharge is authorized, upon proof of two or more
previous convictions within three years preceding the commission of
the offense.
39. 22 C.M.R. 591 (1956).
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mander attended a conference held by the division commander who
expressed concern over the AWOL rate and stated that repeated
offenders could be tried by general court-martial. The repeated
offender could then be separated from the service with a dishonora-
ble discharge. On the same day as the conference, the intermediate
commander directed that the accused be tried by general court-
martial. The battalion commander withdrew the charges from the
special court and ordered the required investigation. Although the
investigating officer recommended trial by special court, the case
was forwarded to the division commander. It was referred for trial
by general court-martial one day after the division commander's
conference remarks had been formalized into an express policy
that "all cases" of third offenses of absence without leave "will be"
tried by general courts-martial. Although nothing was found le-
gally objectionable concerning the conference announcement, the
fixed policy was held to interfere directly with fair and impartial
pretrial proceedings. Neither the company commander nor the bat-
talion commander was free to exercise his own discretion in the
disposition of the case. The original recommendations were not
only overruled, but the commanders were placed in a position
where they had to change the original recommendations from trial
by inferior court to trial by general court-martial.
The exercise of unlawful command control is not limited to a
superior convening authority. A battalion executive officer's ac-
tion convincing a company commander to recommend trial by gen-
eral court-martial, even though he had initially and possibly im-
properly recommended imposition of nonjudicial punishment, has
been held an unlawful exercise of command control depriving the
accused of the independent recommendation of his immediate com-
mander.40
Command control of a subordinate commander's prosecutorial
discretion is strictly limited. This limitation includes control of
subordinate commanders' recommendations concerning the choice
of forum for a particular case. A superior commander may prop-
erly issue directives designed as recommendations to his subordi-
nates. When these directives are interpreted as mandatory they
enter the prohibited area of unlawful control of the judicial proc-
40. United States v. Charleson, 26 C.M.R. 630 (1958).
esses. Additionally, an attempt to coerce or unlawfully control a
subordinate convening authority with respect to his judicial acts is
prohibited; however, the prohibition against the use of censure,
reprimand, admonishment, low efficiency ratings, transfers, preven-
tion of grade advancement and elimination from the armed forces
is noticeably absent from the Code provision which applies to con-
vening authorities.41
2. Improper Imposition of Nonjudicial Punishinent.
A superior commander may be concerned with the improper im-
position of nonjudicial punishment for an offense which he consid-
ers properly triable by courts-martial. In this area command con-
trol is virtually unrestricted. In United States v. Wharton,42 in-
voluntary manslaughter charges were preferred against the ac-
cused and investigated pursuant to Article 32 of the Code. The in-
vestigating officer recommended imposition of nonjudicial punish-
ment which was imposed by the officer exercising general courts-
martial jurisdiction. Thereafter, the punishment was set aside by
a superior commander who directed that charges be preferred. Dis-
agreeing with the investigating officer's recommendation of trial
by special court-martial, the superior authority referred the charges
for trial by general court-martial. It was held that an accused
has a right to proper pretrial procedure including the exercise of
discretion by inferior commanders in disposing of charges adminis-
tratively or trial by the lowest court empowered to adjudge an ap-
propriate sentence. The Board of Review indicated that this did
not mean a superior commander was completely deprived of his
right to control his subordinates in their handling of disciplinary
problems.
In arriving at this conclusion the Board cited Judge Latimer's
concurring opinion in Hawthorne:
In various areas involving disciplinary problems--of which judicial
procedure is a necessary part-the convening authority has certain
powers of his own, and unless he exceeds his authority he has a
right to control his subordinates without interference by this Court.
One of his duties is to determine personally whether a given charge
or group of charges warrant trial by general court-martial, and he
may go to reasonable lengths to insure that commanders with less
authority do not use their offices to nullify his choice of forum. To
illustrate my views, I submit the following example: I believe di-
vision or comparable Navy and Air Force commanders may prop-
erly inform their subordinate commanders that they must not refer
41. See UCMJ art. 37, 10 U.S.C. § 837 (1970).
42. United States v. Wharton, 33 C.M.R. 729, petition denied, 14 U.S.C.
M.A. 670, 33 C.M.R. 436 (1963).
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robbery, grand larceny, or narcotic cases to special courts-martial
without obtaining his special permission. Special courts-martial
may be convened by subordinate commanders, Article 23(a), Uni-
form Code of Military Justice, 50 USC see. 587, and if their choice
of forum cannot be circumscribed, then those officers commanding
higher echelons might be seriously crippled in maintaining order
and discipline in their command. On the other hand, the same
commanders would have no right to inform members of general
courts-martial that they must adjudge a sentence greater than that
which could be given by special courts-martial if they found an ac-
cused guilty of any of the enumerated offenses. The determina-
tion of an appropriate sentence within the limits set by the Presi-
dent is a prerogative of the court-martial, and the law brooks no in-
terference by commanders with that power ... 4a
Although this concurring opinion was employed in Wharton, the
majority opinion of Hawthorne and the Sims decision represent the
current law. The decision in Wharton turns upon the premise that
nonjudicial punishment does not bar subsequent trial for other
than minor offenses.4 In the area of improper imposition of non-
judicial punishment, the question is not one of unlawful command
control but whether such punishment is a bar to trial. Although
a discussion of command control is utilized in Wharton, the case is
not good precedent for this area of the law. Additionally, Wharton
has not been cited in any other reported decision.
Withdrawal or Reservation of Authority to Convene Courts-Martial
With the implementation of the Military Justice Act of 1968,
many staff judge advocates found it administratively convenient
to reduce the number of special court-martial jurisdictions to
which they were required to provide legal service. This reduction
has been generally accomplished by withdrawal or reservation of
special courts-martial authority by the superior commander.
Withdrawal or reservation of courts-martial authority is based
upon the Manual provision which provides, in pertinent part,
A superior competent authority may convene the court to try any
other case in a subordinate command if he so desires (Art. 22(b) ).
Thus, if the exigencies of the service interfere with the prompt dis-
position of cases, a superior competent to convene general courts-
martial properly may convene courts for the trial of cases arising
in a subordinate command. 4 5
43. Id. at 733, quoting 7 U.S.C.M.A. at 300, 22 C.M.R. at 290.
44. United States v. Wharton, 33 C.M.R. 729, petition denied, 14
U.S.C.M.A. 670, 33 C.M.R. 436 (1963).
45. MCM 1969, para. 5a(3).
In discussing special courts-martial convening authorities, the Man-
ual is more specific:
The power of the squadron or battalion commander to convene spe-
cial courts-martial is subject to the power of superior competent
authority to reserve to himself the right to convene these courts for
any or all subordinate units and detachments in his command. (4)
A subordinate commander may exercise his power to convene spe-
cial courts-martial unless a competent superior reserves that power
to himself and so notifies the subordinate.46
The Code is narrower and contains no provision for withdrawal
or reservation of the authority to convene special courts-martial.4 7
A grant provided by statute to confer courts-martial authority
cannot be delegated; and, it is contrary to law to purport to dele-
gate this authority to a flag or general officer.48 Clearly authority
to convene courts-martial is conferred by Congress. Absent an ex-
press grant, it necessarily follows that such authority cannot be re-
served or withheld except by Congress. No such grant is expressed
in the Code. The principle is further borne out by the Court of
Military Appeals:
From an analysis of Article 23 ... it is evident that Congress be-
lieved that special court-martial authority was an important power
to be conferred sparingly. In subsections (1) through (6) it spe-
cifically described the various types of command in which such au-
thority was to vest by virtue of the fact of command alone.40
The legal effect of an attempted reservation of courts-martial
authority is not often litigated. In Tallent,50 a superior authority
had directed that cases of statutory rape not be tried by inferior
courts-martial. The accused was convicted by summary court mar-
tial of statutory rape and sentenced to thirty days restriction to
camp. Subsequently, the summary court-martial convening au-
thority was informed by the area commander that the specification
failed to state an offense and that the proceedings were null and
Void. A special order was issued setting aside the findings and sen-
tence in accordance with the instructions of superior authority. At
a general court-martial convened by the superior authority, the
accused unsuccessfully asserted former jeopardy. In reversing the
conviction, a Board of Review concluded that the specification be-
fore the summary court-martial did state an offense, the proceed-
ings were complete and jeopardy had attached. The Board stated,
46. Id. paras. 5b(3), (4).
47. UCMJ art. 23(b), 10 U.S.C. § 823(b) (1970).
48. United States v. Greenwell, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 460, 42 C.M.R. 62 (1970).
49. Id. at 463, 42 C.M.R. at 65 (emphasis added).
50. 7 B.R. (E.T.O.) 141 (1944) (C.M. 2550).
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"[A] Ithough the commanding officer was directed not to try cases
of statutory rape by inferior courts-martial, such direction could not
deprive the summary court-martial of jurisdiction conferred by
statute."'" At the time of the Tallent decision, the Manual provi-
sion was similar to that of the present Manual and provided,
The subordinate commander may exercise the power to appoint
special courts-martial for his command unless a competent superior
deems it desirable to reserve that power to himself and so notifies
the subordinate.52
It is concluded that the present Manual provision exceeds the au-
thority of the Code and has no legal statutory basis.
The effect of an attempt by a superior to forbid trial by a court
convened by a subordinate authority may well violate Article 37 of
the Code as unlawful control of the action of a convening authority
with respect to his judicial acts.58 The proper action for the superi-
or commander would seem to be to relieve a subordinate from com-
mand where it is clear that the subordinate abuses his prosecutorial
discretion. This remedy is based upon the principle that court-mar-
tial authority is vested by virtue of the fact of command alone.5 4
Any attempt by the superior authority to withdraw or reserve
court-martial authority vested in a subordinate commander is a pos-
sible exercise of unlawful command control.
III. THE CONVENING AUTHORITY As AccusER
General
A convening authority may take such a personal interest in a case
that he becomes an accuser. This personal interest may result in
unlawful command control since he can select the court and, as re-
viewing authority, pass upon the proceedings. The result of becom-
ing an accuser may deprive a commander of the authority to con-
vene the court-martial.
The prohibition against an accuser convening a court-martial was
introduced into American military law by an act of 29 May 1830.55
51. Id.
52. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTrIAL, Urn STATES A~my, 1928, para. 5b.
53. UCMJ art. 37, 10 U.S.C. § 837 (1970). See note 5 supra.
54. United States v. Greenwell, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 460, 42 C.M.R. 62 (1970).
55. WINTHRoP, MInTARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS, 61 (2d ed. rev. & enl.
1920) [hereinafter cited as WINTHROP].
The legislation was prompted by the trial of an Adjutant General
by a court convened by the Commander of the Army, who preferred
the charges, was the prosecuting witness, reviewed the case and ap-
proved the sentence.5 6 The purpose of the accuser prohibition is to
prevent unlawful command control of the court-martial.67 Under
the present Code, the restriction applies to general and special
courts-martial.
If any such commanding officer is an accuser, the court shall be
convened by superior competent authority, and may in any case be
convened by such authority if considered desirable by him.58
The restriction does not apply to trial by summary court-martial. 0
Where the summary court-martial convening authority is the ac-
cuser, the forwarding of the charges to superior authority is discre-
tionary; the fact that the convening authority or summary court
officer is the accuser does not invalidate the trial.0 0 This archaic
provision is apparently a reflection of the early accuser prohibition
which did not apply to trials of enlisted personnel. 61
The Code's definition of an accuser sets forth three separate cate-
gories: (1) A person who signs and swears to charges; (2) Any per-
son who directs charges be signed and sworn by another; and (3)
Any other person who has an interest other than an official inter-
est in the prosecution of the accused. 62 An examination of the
charge sheet readily reveals the accuser of the first category. The
second category has been virtually ignored by the courts and has
been included in the last category as cases of other than official in-
terest in the prosecution of the accused.
In the early case of United States v. Gordon,08 the accused was
charged with burglary of a general officer's house and attempted
burglary of another general officer's house, the latter coincidentally
being the convening authority. The convening authority dismissed
the specification for attempted burglary of his house. The accused
was tried and convicted of the remaining offense. The Court of
Military Appeals reversed the conviction concluding that the con-
vening authority was an accuser and not competent to convene the
court. It was announced that the test to be applied was whether
the convening authority was so closely connected to the offense
56. Id. at 62 n.33.
57. United States v. La Grange, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 342, 3 C.M.R. 76 (1952).
58. UCMJ arts. 22(b), 23(b), 10 U.S.C. §§ 822(b), 823(b) (1970).
59. UCMJ art. 24, 10 U.S.C. § 824 (1970).
60. MCM 1969, para. 5c.
61. WINTm O, supra note 55, at 61 n.31.
62. UCMJ art. 1(9), 10 U.S.C. § 801(9) (1970).
63. 1 U.S.C.M.A. 255, 2 C.M.R. 161 (1952).
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that a reasonable person would conclude that he had a personal in-
terest in the matter.
This principle was applied at Department of the Army level in
United States v. Grow.64 The accused, a major general, was
charged with violations of security regulations and dereliction of
duty after photostats of his diary containing classfied material ap-
peared in a communist publication. The Army Chief of Staff di-
rected an investigation which was later submitted to the Office of
the Judge Advocate General for preparation of appropriate charges.
After charges were preferred and approved by the Chief of Staff
and the Secretary of the Army, they were forwarded to the ac-
cused's immediate superior, an Army commander, for appropriate
action. The accused contended that the Secretary of the Army and
Chief of Staff were accusers and that the officer who preferred the
charges was a nominal accuser. It was asserted that the case
should have been forwarded to the next superior, the President.
The Court held that in view of the serious nature of the charges
and the rank and position of the accused, the decision to proceed
with or prohibit disciplinary measures could be made only at the
highest military level. The Court found that it could not be con-
cluded that the interests of the Chief of Staff and Secretary of the
Army were other than official.
The convening authority is not an accuser merely because he di-
rected an investigation and an assistant staff judge advocate pre-
ferred the charges.6 5 The danger of the application of the Grow
reasoning is illustrated by a Board of Review decision. 66 After in-
vestigation, superior authority ordered that a squadron commander
be charged with certain offenses arising out of cheating at cards.
The Board held that due to the rank and position of the accused,
the decision to proceed could only be made at the highest military
level.
Considering this result the same principle can be applied to a
ranking officer of any division or comparable unit. The difficulty
can be observed readily if applied to a brigade or battalion where
company grade officers occupy important positions. The result of
64. 3 U.S.C.M.A. 77, 11 C.M.R. 77 (1953).
65. United States v. Jewson, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 652, 2 C.M.R. 80 (1952).
66. United States v. West, 16 C.M.R. 587, petition denied, 4 U.S.C.M.A.
744, 20 C.M.R. 398 (1954).
such an improper application of this principle is a complete disre-
gard for the prohibition against an accuser convening a court-mar-
tial.
Willful Disobedience Offenses and the Accuser Problem
A convening authority will become an accuser in a case which in-
volves the willful disobedience of an order issued by him. In Unit-
ed States v. Marsh,67 the accused was given a direct order to pro-
ceed to his assigned station. The order was issued "by command
of" the convening authority. In setting aside the conviction be-
cause the convening authority was the accuser, the court stated,
.. the latter [convening authority] had a personal interest in
seeing his orders were obeyed. Military disciple and order is based
upon obedience to superiors and every commander jealously, but
rightly, requires compliance and frowns on disobedience. For that
and other reasons we cannot say that a superior officer would be
entirely impartial in selecting a court to try a given case where the
accused was charged with willful disobedience of the order. 8
The convening authority does not become an accuser where the
accused is charged with failure to obey his order. In United States
v. Keith,6 9 the accused was charged with failure to obey an order
of the convening authority to proceed to a certain station. The
Court held that the convening authority was not an accuser since
there was no evidence of willful flaunting of his authority. He was
not placed in a situation where his own personal direct order to a
subordinate had been willfully challenged.
The convening authority does not become an accuser merely be-
cause he testifies for the prosecution. Where the convening author-
ity testifies in order to authenticate records which are questioned at
trial, he is not an accuser but may be disqualified from reviewing
the case.70 His status as an accuser is determined as of the time he
convenes the court; his testimony determines whether he has a
personal interest in the outcome of the case at the time he con-
vened the court.71
Who Is Superior Competent Authority?
When the convening authority is an accuser, the case shall be
convened by superior competent authority.72 The Manual provides,
67. 3 U.S.C.M.A. 48, 11 C.M.R. 48 (1953).
68. Id. at 52, 11 C.M.R. at 52.
69. 3 U.S.C.M.A. 579, 13 C.M.R. 135 (1953).
70. United States v. McCleeny, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 507, 18 C.M.R. 131 (1955).
71. Id.
72. UCMJ arts. 22(b), 23(b), 10 U.S.C. §§ 822(b), 823(b) (1970).
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When any commanding officer who would normally convene the
general court-martial is the accuser in the case, he shall refer the
charges to a superior competent authority who will either convene
the court or designate another competent convening authority who
is superior in rank to that accuser ... to exercise jurisdiction.7 3
This principle is applicable to trials by special courts-martial.74 In
United States v. La Grange,75 a superior authority directed that an
officer junior in rank to the accused convene the court. The desig-
nated officer was not in the same chain of command as the accused.
The court held that the officer junior to the accused could not con-
vene the court because competent superior authority, if not in the
same chain of command, means an authority superior to the ac-
cused. The question of whether superior competent authority em-
braces only those officers who are senior both in rank and command
has not been resolved by the Court. 76 A Board of Review has held
that a superior authority must be superior under either of the alter-
native criteria.77
Criticism of Application of the Accuser Prohibition
In determining whether the convening authority is an accuser,
the court has relied heavily on the test of personal interest. The
nominal accuser provision of the Code has been virtually ignored.
The result is that the convening authority can direct that charges be
preferred against an accused.78 A convening authority is not likely
to act impartially with respect to a case in which he has directed
that charges be preferred. The criticism that the convening author-
ity prefers charges, selects the court members and reviews the find-
ings and sentence of the court has some validity. In order to avoid
the appearance of the evil of unlawful command control, a strict
application of the accuser prohibition must be observed.
In the area of "disobedience" offenses, the distinction between
willful disobedience and failure to obey appears to be a fiction. If it
is sound reasoning that every superior requires compliance and
73. MCM 1969, para. 5a(3).
74. MCM 1969, para. 5b(2).
75. 1 U.S.C.M.A. 342, 3 C.M.R. 76 (1952).
76. United States v. Haygood, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 481, 482, 31 C.M.R. 67, 68(1961).
77. United States v. Kostes, 38 C.M.R. 513 (1967).
78. See United States v. Wharton, 33 C.M.R. 729, petition denied, 14
U.S.C.M.A. 670, 33 C.M.R. 436 (1963).
frowns upon disobedience of his orders, the difference between will-
fulness and failure to obey is a matter of degree. The prohibition
against an accuser convening the court should apply to both of-
fenses.
The accuser prohibitions do not apply to trials by summary
courts-martial. Thus under the Code a single officer of a unit who
also has summary court-martial jurisdiction may prefer charges,
act as summary court and review the findings and sentence. Such
a provision is not only outdated, but may subject the military ser-
vices to criticism. It has no proper place in a modem judicial
system.
IV. COi AND CONTROL OVER COURT MEMBERS
Detailing Court Members
The authority to convene courts-martial includes the authority
to select the members who will serve on the court. This includes
authority, subject to limitations, to detail trial counsel, defense
counsel and a military judge.79 With the creation of the independ-
ent judiciary, detailing of the military judge by the convening au-
thority has become a mere formality. The authority to detail court
members is an area where the commander exercises great control
over courts-martial. Commanders have been known to select as
court members personnel who are likely to follow the commander's
desires rather than use independent judgment in deciding a case.
Where three officers of a general court-martial were assigned as
permanent members with the senior officer preparing efficiency
reports on the other two, the Court of Mfilitary Appeals has indi-
cated that the permanent aspect of the court membership made it
appear packed.80
The detailing of a large number of members with the intent that
only some will be present at each trial has been condemned as re-
flecting unfavorably on the dignity of the court, as giving a casual
appearance to convening the court, and making it appear that a
subordinate of the convening authority was selecting the composi-
tion of the court for trial.8 1 A similar method was condemned in
United States v. Mclaughin" where the convening authority de-
tailed a court consisting of a president and twelve members. By
memorandum court sessions were scheduled with only three mem-
79. See UCMJ arts. 25-27, 10 U.S.C. §§ 825-27 (1970).
80. United States v. Deain, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 44, 7 C.M.R. 44 (1955).
81. See United States v. Allen, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 626, 18 C.M.R. 250 (1955);
United States v. Andress, 11 C.M.R. 299 (1953).
82. 18 U.S.C.M.A. 61, 39 C.M.R. 61 (1968).
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bers detailed to each session. All other members were considered
excused by express consent of the convening authority. The court
held the use of this method constituted an unlawful exercise of
command control by seizing the power and responsibility conferred
by statute upon the president of the court-martial. By the memo-
randum, the convening authority controlled the sessions of the
court, the person presiding as president at each session and the
members who would sit at each session. Control over the composi-
tion and function of a court-martial is a different matter from
excusing one or more members from attending a particular trial for
a proper reason.
An attempt has been made to clarify the prohibition of this prac-
tice by a provision that the convening order "should designate no
more members than those who are expected to be present for trial
of cases referred to the court which it convenes. 8 3
The detailing of a lawyer as a member of a special court-martial
where complicated issues of law may be presented was expressly
permitted in the past.8 4 That practice appears to be permissible
although the provision has been deleted from the present Manual.
The detailing of an attorney to the court in a simple factual case
after the accused had retained civilian counsel "smack[ed] of
court packing." 5
A claim of discrimination was held to be without substance where
no Negro had been detailed as military judge or court member for
a two-year period8 6 The deliberate selection of a Negro as a court
member for trial of a Negro accused has been upheld.81
The criteria for detailing members of the court is contained in
the following Code provision:
When convening a court-martial, the convening authority shall de-
tail as members thereof such members of the armed forces as, in his
opinion, are best qualified for the duty by reason of age, education,
training, experience, length of service, and judicial temperament.
No member of an armed force is eligible to serve as a member of a
83. MCM 1969, para. 36b.
84. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MRTIAL, 1951, para. 4d [hereinafter cited as
Mem 1951].
85. See United States v. Sears, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 661, 668, 20 C.M.R. 377, 384
(1956).
86. United States v. Swift, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 227, 38 C.M.R. 25 (1967).
87. United States v. Crawford, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 31, 35 C.M.R. 3 (1964).
general or special court-martial when he is the accuser or a witness
for the prosecution or has acted as investigating officer or as coun-
sel in the same case.88
This provision of the Code leaves the commander virtually unre-
stricted in the detailing of court members. By application of the
use of the phrase "in his opinion," the statute can reasonably be
interpreted to permit detailing of members who share the opinions
of the convening authority. Decisions of the Court of Military Ap-
peals have restricted the mode of selection but seem to reflect little
concern with the personnel that compose the membership of a
court.8 9 Little restriction is placed upon command control of the
detailing of membership of courts-martial.
Instructing the Court
Although the commander can select members of courts-martial
who in his opinion are best qualified for such duty, it has not been
unusual to attempt to control the processes of the court by instruct-
ing the members. This practice was encouraged by the 1951 Man-
ual.
A convening authority may, through his staff judge advocate or le-
gal officer or otherwise, give general instructions to the personnel
of a court-martial which he has appointed, preferably before any
cases have been referred to the court for trial. When a staff judge
advocate or legal officer is present with the command such instruc-
tion should be given through such officer. Such instruction may
relate to the rules of evidence, burden of proof, presumption of in-
nocence, and may include information as to the state of discipline
in the command, as to the prevalence of offenses which have im-
paired efficiency and discipline, and of command measures which
have been taken to prevent offenses.9 0
On review of cases alleging unlawful command control, the court
has considered several factors in determining the issue. (1) Source
of the instruction. The court has condemned lectures furnished by
the staff judge advocate where he was superior in rank and, as a
staff member, could reasonably have been considered a conduit for
the desires of the convening authority.91 This factor was exhibited
by an assistant staff judge advocate who used a letter purporting
to be a personal request for information but written on official
stationery.9 2 (2) Recipients of the instruction. Improper command
88. UCMJ art. 25(d) (2), .10 U.S.C. § 825 (d) (2) (1970) (emphasis added).
89. But see United States v. Greene, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 232, 43 C.M.R. 72
(1970). The court condemned detailing of only colonels and lieutenant
colonels as court members.
90. MCM 1951, para. 38.
91. See United States v. Zagar, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 410, 18 C.M.R. 34 (1955).
92. See United States v. Kitchens, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 589, 31 C.M.R. 175
(1961).
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control was more likely to be found when given only to members of
a court-martial 93 than when given to all officers of the command.94
(3) Time relationship to the case in question. The Court con-
demned cases where the pretrial instruction occurred after the
court convened9 5 or immediately prior to trial.9 6 Instructions giv-
en one to three months prior to trial were held not to constitute un-
lawful command control.9 7 (4) Nature of the instruction. Instruc-
tions emphasizing that court members should not usurp the con-
vening authority's prerogative, 98 that sentences have been too mea-
ger,9 9 or lenient, 00 that careful pretrial investigation insures only
a guilty person is tried,'0 ' and discussions of other acts of miscon-
duct for which the accused will not be tried'0 2 have been held to
constitute unlawful command control.
Although the Code permits general instructions concerning sub-
stantive and procedural aspects of courts-martial, 0 3 the Army has
prohibited such lectures. 0 4 It has been recognized that regardless
of the subject matter included in instructions given to a court there
is still an appearance of evil and distrust created by the mere fact
the instruction is given.' 05
Control by Use of Efficiency Reports
The efficiency or fitness report has been a commander's tool in
exercising control over members of a court. In United States
v. Littrice,10 6 a commander's remarks that appropriate notations
93. See United States v. Wright, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 110, 37 C.M.R. 374 (1967);
United States v. Littrice, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 487, 13 C.M.R. 43 (1953).
94. See United States v. Albert, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 111, 36 C.M.R. 267 (1966);
United States v. Isbell, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 782, 14 C.M.R. 200 (1954). But see
United States v. Hawthorne, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 293, 22 C.M.R. 83 (1956).
95. See United States v. Kitchens, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 589, 31 C.M.R. 175
(1961); United States v. Guest, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 147, 11 C.M.R. 147 (1953).
96. Cases cited note 91 supra.
97. See United States v. Danzine, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 350, 30 C.M.R. 350
(1961); United States v. Navarre, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 32, 17 C.M.R. 32 (1954).
98. United States v. Littrice, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 487, 13 C.M.R. 43 (1953).
99. United States v. Hunter, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 497, 13 CM.R. 53 (1953).
100. United States v. Williams, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 459, 29 C.M.R. 275 (1960).
101. United States v. Zagar, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 410, 18 C.M.R. 34 (1955).
102. United States v. McCann, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 675, 25 C.M.R. 179 (1958).
103. UCMJ art. 37(a) (1), 10 U.S.C. § 837(a) (1) (1970).
104. See Army Regulation 350-212 (16 May 1969).
105. United States v. Padilla, 30 C.M.R. 481, 486 (1960).
106. United States v. Littrice, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 487, 13 C.M.R. 43 (1953).
would be made in efficiency reports were held to result in prejudice
to the accused. The court reasoned that an outstanding perform-
ance rating should apply equally to all military duties and no ne-
cessity existed to single out duty as a court-martial member. The
action was considered to be a veiled threat; members who followed
the directive and voted to convict and to impose a dishonorable dis-
charge were to be commended while those who did not would go
unnoticed.
The same instruction was examined in United States v. Isbell.107
The reference to efficiency reports was held to be nonprejudicial
since it was given prior to the time the offense was committed.
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Brosman found little reason to dis-
tinguish between a veiled threat from a commander read to court
members immediately before trial and one made known to most of
the members prior to the commission of the offense.
In United States v. Navarre0" the commanding officer's instruc-
tions made reference to a commander who gave lower efficiency
ratings to an officer as a result of his performance as a member of
a court-martial. The Court considered the reference to efficiency
reports as predicated wholly upon an individual's failure to be gov-
erned by the guiding norm of our system of equal justice under the
law. Considering the fact that the comment was made three
months prior to the court-martial, unlawful command control was
not found.
An extreme example of improper command control appeared in
United States v. Deain.109 Three officers of a general court-martial
were permanent members with the senior officer, a rear admiral,
assigned the duty of preparing and submitting efficiency reports on
the other two members. To aggravate matters, the senior member
stated on several occasions that personnel sent to trial must be
guilty of something. On voir dire he indicated that he did not
recognize the presumption of innocence as a constitutional right
since he did not regard military personnel as possessing any consti-
tutional rights other than those which may have been duplicated
by specific grants of Congress. Commenting upon fitness reports
the court stated:
... A court member's freedom and independence of action must re-
main inviolate. For his actions and his motives he should be re-
sponsible only to God and his conscience. Danger of infringement
of these rights is generated by the fitness report here.11O
107. 3 U.S.C.M.A. 782, 14 C.M.R. 200 (1954).
108. United States v. Navarre, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 32, 17 C.M.R. 32 (1954).
109. 5 U.S.C.M.A. 44, 17 C.M.R. 44 (1954).
110. Id. at 53, 17 C.M.R. at 53.
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By the Military Justice Act of 1968, Congress attempted to pro-
hibit the consideration of an individual's performance as a member
of a court-martial in preparing effectiveness, fitness or efficiency
reports."' Although such an attempt is commendable, it does not
take into consideration the more subtle methods a commander may
use in preparing such reports. A rating officer who may be inclined
to violate the prohibition is not likely to express the actual rea-
sons for his rating and no doubt will be able to find legitimate rea-
sons to accomplish his purpose. Since there have been no reported
cases of prosecution for a violation of Article 98 of the Code, there is
little reason to believe such a violation will be prosecuted in the
future.
V. COMMAND CONTROL OVER COUNSEL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL
AD THE MILITARY JUDGE
The Trial Counsel
A commander has the statutory duty to detail trial counsel for
the prosecution of a case. The commander can properly exert much
more control over the trial counsel than the defense counsel. In
United States v. Haimson,"1 2 instructions, addressed to the trial
counsel were signed over the command line of the convening au-
thority. A sworn statement by an assistant staff judge advocate
indicated that the instructions to the trial counsel were prepared
under his direction, approved by the staff judge advocate and
signed by an assistant adjutant. The indorsement advised trial
counsel that he should make a brief opening statement, what wit-
nesses should be called, what testimony should be elicited, what
documents were available, that witnesses might refuse to testify
based upon the privilege against self incrimination, that he should
submit requests for instructions and that if the accused were found
guilty and presented evidence in mitigation, he could properly pre-
sent evidence in aggravation. In holding the convening authority
was not an accuser the court reasoned that the substance of the di-
rective was controlling. There was nothing in the content of the
directive to suggest that the convening authority or the members
of his staff had predetermined the accused's guilt or innocence, nor
Ill. UCMJ art. 37(b), 10 U.S.C. § 837(b) (1970).
112. 5 U.S.C.M.A. 208, 17 C.M.R. 208 (1954).
was there anything reflecting a personal interest on the part of the
convening authority in the outcome of the trial.
The staff judge advocate has considerable latitude in controlling
the conduct of trial counsel during the trial. Although he is almost
unrestricted in the instructions he may give to trial counsel con-
cerning a particular case, he cannot give instructions which are
clearly in violation of law. In United States v. Kennedy,'1" trial
counsel had joined with the defense in a motion to dismiss for insuf-
ficient evidence since the prosecution's chief witness was hostile
and noncommital. The staff judge advocate ordered trial counsel to
move for a continuance to allow sufficient time to threaten and
coerce the witness into testifying. The court termed the order un-
lawful. The use of command control to intimidate, tamper with, or
influence the testimony of a witness is unlawful."14
Trial counsel may be given detailed instructions for the prosecu-
tion of his case so long as they are labeled "suggestions." 15 It is
only necessary that they do not reduce trial counsel to an automo-
ton.1 6 The convening authority may direct trial counsel to change
a specification to conform with the evidence.ll 7 It is not unlawful
command control to order the trial counsel to abandon a motion
to withdraw a specification since, to do otherwise, would nullify
the power of the convening authority to refer a case to trial.118
Trial counsel may be the vehicle through whom command policy
may be conveyed improperly to members of the court. Thus, it has
been held improper for trial counsel, in argument on sentence, to
refer to departmental instructions setting forth the policy on reten-
tion of those convicted of offenses involving moral turpitude.11
Cautionary instructions may not purge the prejudice to the accused
resulting from such an argument.1 20
Unlawful command control may be interjected into the proceed-
ings at trial by arguing on sentence that the convening authority
undoubtedly thought the accused should receive a punitive dis-
charge and confinement commensurate with the offense.' 2' At a
rehearing it has been held prejudicial for trial counsel to enter into
113. 8 U.S.C.M.A. 251, 24 C.M.R. 61 (1957).
114. United States v. Long, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 60, 6 C.M.R. 60 (1952).
115. United States v. Mallicote, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 19, 32 C.M.R. 374 (1962).
116. United States v. Haimson, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 208, 27 C.M.R. 208 (1954).
117. United States v. Overton, 14 C.M.R. 489 (1954).
118. United States v. Burke, 7 C.M.R. 745, petition denied, 2 U.S.C.M.A.
688, 7 C.M.R. 84 (1952).
119. United States v. Fowle, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 349, 22 C.M.R. 139 (1956).
120. United States v. Allen, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 317, 43 C.M.R. 157 (1971).
121. United States v. Lackey, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 718, 25 C.M.R. 222 (1958).
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evidence a record of previous conviction also showing the conven-
ing authority had criticized a previous court for not adjudging a
punitive discharge. 122 An argument on sentence that the conven-
ing authority had already reduced the punishment by referring the
case to a special court-martial and that the maximum punishment
for the offenses was more than a special court-martial could impose
has been held to be prejudicial.12 3
Defense Counsel
The detailing of defense counsel is the statutory duty of the con-
vening authority and is subject to few limitations. 2 4 The selection
is shared with the accused who may request military counsel of his
own choice if reasonably available or who has a right to be repre-
sented by civilian counsel at the accused's expense. 2 5 An appeal
procedure to the next higher commander is contemplated where re-
quested military counsel has been determined not reasonably avail-
able.120
Reported cases of the unlawful exercise of command control are
rare. In United States v. Dobr,127 an order that counsel would not,
for security reasons, present evidence, motions or argument based
upon the accused's activities for several years prior to his offense
was held to be prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused.
Although a commander has broad discretion in detailing counsel
from among those eligible within his command, once counsel has
been detailed the commander loses a great deal of control over that
officer. The relieving of a defense counsel who apparently would
not agree to admission of a deposition taken under questionable
circumstances was condemned because the relief of original counsel,
coupled with the change of tactics by new counsel, raised substan-
tial doubt if the accused was afforded a fair trial. 28 The court has
stated its position concerning unlawful command control of the de-
fense counsel in the following terms:
... [H]e has a solemn duty to defend unreservedly the interests
of the accused he has sworn to protect, and fear of disfavor should
122. United States v. Coffield, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 77, 27 C.M.R. 151 (1958).
123. United States v. Crutcher, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 483, 29 C.M.R. 299 (1960).
124. UCMJ art. 27, 10 U.S.C. § 27 (1970); MCM 1969, para. 6.
125. UCMJ art. 38(b), 10 U.S.C. § 838(b) (1970); MCM 1969, para. 48.
126. MCM 1969, para. 48.
127. 21 C.M.R. 451 (1956).
128. United States v. Plant, 8 C.M.R. 384 (1953).
not deter him from using all honorable means to protect his client's
cause. No system of justice can flourish if the representation af-
forded an accused person is to be neglected because of fear of re-
prisals. Nor can military justice succeed if those officers who must
defend an accused inadequately protect him because they dare not
assert every right guaranteed him by the Code.129
Superiors have not been unwilling to use the efficiency report as
a method of control over a defense counsel. 3 0 As a result superiors
are prohibited from giving a less favorable effectiveness, fitness, ef-
ficiency, other report or document for the purpose of advancement
in grade, assignment or transfer of any defense counsel because of
the zeal with which defense counsel represented any accused before
a court-martial.' 3 ' This statutory prohibition provides little pro-
tection to counsel since a superior inclined to give a less favorable
rating is not likely to use the prohibited subject matter as the basis.
The prohibition will provide little comfort to a defense counsel who
has knowledge of the fact that prosecution of the superior who vio-
lates the provision is unlikely.
An accused's right to be represented by detailed military defense
counsel is fundamental to due process' 3 2 The relationship between
an accused and appointed counsel may not be severed for adminis-
trative convenience. 33  Mere change of duty station is not suffi-
cient reason to replace detailed defense counsel over the objection
of the accused. 34
The Military Judge
With the enactment of Article 26, Uniform Code of Military Jus-
tice, the basic step was taken toward making the military judge
comparable to a federal judge. Two basic areas remain within the
proper control of the convening authority. First, the military judge
has no authority over a particular case until he is detailed to a
court by specific orders and the case is referred for trial. Second,
certain rulings involving questions of law may be appealed by the
prosecution to the convening authority and the military judge must
accede to his view. 35
A court-martial does not exist until convened by a person em-
powered to convene it.' 36 A military judge does not become part
129. United States v. McMahan, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 709, 717, 21 C.M.R. 31, 39
(1956).
130. 1966 Hearings at 303.
131. UCMJ art. 37(b), 10 U.S.C. § 837(b) (1970).
132. United States v. Tavolilla, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 395, 38 C.M.R. 193 (1968).
133. United States v. Tellier, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 323, 32 C.M.R. 323 (1962).
134. United States v. Murray, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 61, 42 C.M.R. 253 (1970).
135. UCMJ art. 62(a), 10 U.S.C. § 862(a) (1970); MCM 1969, para. 67f.
136. See MCM 1969, para. 8.
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of a court until detailed by orders and, unlike his civilian counter-
part, has no authority over a case until so detailed. Once detailed
his duties relate generally to presiding over open sessions of the
trial.13 7 Prior to reference of the case to a court, judicial functions
remain a duty of the convening authority. It is questionable
whether a military judge can authorize a search without approval
of the Judge Advocate General or his designee. 38 A military judge
will not be comparable to a federal judge until he is granted similar
authority.
The convening authority is permitted by statute to return a rul-
ing on a motion to dismiss not amounting to a finding of not guilty
to a court for reconsideration of the judge's ruling. In cases involv-
ing questions solely of law, the military judge must accede to the
view of the convening authority. 39 This practice is normally the
function of appellate courts. Although appellate judges are law-
yers and, generally convening authorities are not, Congress has in-
vested the convening authority with judicial power and responsi-
bilities in connection with the administration of military criminal
law.140 The procedure has been held not to violate military due
process. Certain anomalies in military practice exist in comparison
with procedures in the federal civilian courts but a difference of
procedure is not tantamount to a due process defect.141 There is
no constitutional impediment to Congress investing a convening au-
thority with certain judicial powers in relation to the administra-
tion of military justice simply because he is not trained in the
law. 42
The Court has held that the convening authority can return a
charge which has been dismissed for lack of speedy trial.143 How-
ever, the convening authority cannot direct trial to proceed after a
continuance has been granted since this would enable him to exer-
cise unlawful command control over the proceedings. 44 An appeal
of a ruling under Article 62 (a) is not an unlawful intrusion into the
137. See MCM 1969, para. 39.
138. UCMJ arts. 26(a), (c), 10 U.S.C. §§ 826(a), (c) (1970).
139. UCMJ art. 62(a), 10 U.S.C. § 862(a) (1970); MCM 1969, para. 67f.
140. United States v. Nix, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 518, 36 C.M.R. 76 (1965).
141. United States v. Turkali, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 340, 20 C.M.R. 56 (1955).
142. Priest v. Koch, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 293, 41 C.M.R. 293 (1970).
143. United States v. Boehm, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 530, 38 C.M.R. 328 (1968).
144. United States v. Knudson, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 587, 16 C.M.R. 161 (1954).
court proceeding; and, the convening authority does not deny the
accused a fair trial even though he has referred that specification to
trial.14
5
At present Article 62(a), Uniform Code of Military Justice, is a
method whereby the commander may properly exercise command
control over the military judge of a court-martial. With the advent
of the military judge in military criminal law, this provision ap-
pears to be unwarranted and archaic. It undermines the authority
of the military judge and could well appear to those outside the ser-
vice to be an unnecessary intrusion by the commander into trial
proceedings.
VI. COMiMAND CONTROL OVER REVIEW OF COURTS-MARTIAL
The convening authority's power to act upon the findings and
sentence of a court-martial is a proper exercise of command control.
Control is not limited to the authority who convenes a court but
may also be exercised by his superiors. When a superior's action
interferes with the personal discretion required of a convening au-
thority, such action may be termed unlawful command control.
The findings and sentence of a court-martial have been termed
mere recommendations to the authority convening the court.
140
This view is not without merit since the convening authority has
the independent duty to weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of
witnesses and determine controverted questions of fact.147 He
must determine the appropriateness of the sentence although he
cannot increase it.14s He is not bound by the opinions of the find-
ers of fact149 and must be satisfied that the accused is guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt 50
In United States v. Duffy,' 5 ' the staff judge advocate found re-
versible error based upon the improper use of an inadmissible con-
fession. The convening authority disapproved the staff judge advo-
cate's recommendation indicating that he was loath to permit a
guilty man to escape just punishment because of a technical failure.
The court termed the convening authority's concept as "repugnant
to elementary justice" and said it was "not only unlawful; it was
lawless."'152
145. Priest v. Koch, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 293, 41 C.M.R. 293 (1970).
146. WInTHROP, supra note 55, at 447.
147. MCM 1969, para. 87.
148. MCM 1969, para. 88a.
149. See United States v. Johnson, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 173, 23 C.M.R. 397 (1957).
150. United States v. Grice, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 166, 23 C.M.R. 390 (1957).
151. 3 U.S.C.M.A. 20, 11 C.M.R. 20 (1963).
152. Id. at 23, 11 C.M.R. at 23.
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The commander faces a greater problem when reviewing the sen-
tence of a court-martial. As convening authority his action must
be independent but he is permitted to consider information from
outside the record of trial.153 In United States v. Doherty,54 the
court adjudged a bad conduct discharge but recommended clem-
ency to include remission of the discharge. Upon advice of his legal
officer, the convening authority approved the discharge noting that
departmental instructions precluded clemency for this class of of-
fenders. The court held that the mistaken interpretation that the
policy was mandatory resulted in a failure by the convening au-
thority to exercise his required independent evaluation of the ap-
propriateness of the sentence.
In a similar case' 55 the convening authority had determined to
suspend an adjudged punitive discharge and to direct rehabilitative
training for the accused. Upon advice of the staff judge advocate
that the higher headquarters indicated retention of this type of
offender was contrary to policy, the sentence was approved. The
court held that injection of an actual or apparent command policy
into the sentencing process violated Article 37 of the Code and de-
nied the accused an individualized review.
The convening authority may be improperly influenced by mem-
bers of his staff. In United States v. Wetzel," 6 the accused's im-
mediate superiors recommended the accused be placed in a reha-
bilitative program. Thereafter, trial counsel alleged by letter that
the accused had refused to cooperate with the government after
trial, had falsely testified that he had been threatened with per-
jury by the trial counsel, had refused to testify at an accomplice's
trial and thus was not a proper subject for rehabilitation. Another
counsel's letter indicated that the accused had refused to testify for
the defense in another case. The review of the staff judge advocate,
which recommended no clemency, did not include these letters al-
though the recommendations for clemency were included. It was
held that influence upon the staff judge advocate, who is required
to advise the convening authority, may directly affect the conven-
ing authority's action. It was indicated that even though these in-
153. United States v. Lansford, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 371, 20 C.M.R. 87 (1955).
154. 5 U.S.C.M.A. 287, 17 C.M.R. 287 (1954).
155. United States v. Frazier, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 28, 34 C.M.R. 474 (1964).
156. 19 U.S.C.M.A. 370, 41 C.M.R. 370 (1970).
temperate letters were not brought to the attention of the conven-
ing authority, there was a fair risk that action based on the advice
was improperly influenced.
The convening authority is disqualified from reviewing a case un-
der certain circumstances and thus may lose command control of
this judicial function. In United States v. Marks, 157 the convening
authority presided over a conference at which investigators sug-
gested someone attempt to purchase marihuana from the accused,
a suspect. The convening authority stated the job required "a good
reliable marine" and personally named the person who ultimately
was the principal prosecution witness. It was determined that the
convening authority had passed judgment as to the credibility of
the government's most important witness prior to the commission
of the offense and was disqualified from reviewing the case.
The convening authority may not review a court-martial where
he has granted immunity to a witness since this also involves ac-
cepting credibility. 5 ' Where he testifies for the prosecution upon
conflicting issues he may not later review the case since it would
require an evaluation of his own testimony."5
Although limitations exist upon command control over initial re-
view of courts-martial, " . . . the convening authority possesses a
judicial power far in excess of that which resides in any other sin-
gle judicial office." 160
VII. PROPOSED LEGISLATION
Relation to Command Control
There were numerous bills introduced during the 91st Congress
relating to military justice. The purpose of the bills to eliminate
command control of courts-martial was expressed in the following
statement:
• ..I am introducing today 11 bills which I believe will imple-
ment the necessary changes to effect a more equitable and effectivejustice system for military personnel. These revisions should fully
eliminate command influence from courts-martial... 161
Many of the bills were reintroduced during the 92nd Congress, and
will probably again be introduced in the next Congress. All pro-
posals were aimed at establishing independent trial commands or
157. 19 U.S.C.M.A. 389, 41 C.M.R. 389 (1970).
158. United States v. White, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 63, 27 C.M.R. 137 (1958).
159. United States v. McClenny, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 507, 18 C.M.R. 131 (1955);
United States v. Taylor, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 523, 18 C.M.R. 147 (1955).
160. United States v. Nix, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 578, 580, 36 C.M.R. 76, 78 (1965).
161. 116 CONG. REc. 27218 (1970) (remarks of Senator Hatfield).
[VOL. 10: 72, 19721 Command Control
SAN DMEGO LAW REVIEW
circuits and selection of court members at random; the authority
and method of selecting members of courts-martial; authority to de-
tail counsel and military judge; authority to convene and initially
review courts-martial. Only those provisions directly related to
the exercise of command control of courts-martial will be dis-
cussed.
The Hatfield Bills
Senator Hatfield proposed to establish armed forces judicial cir-
cuits throughout the world.162 Each circuit would be divided into
a Field Judiciary, Trial Counsel, Defense Counsel and Trial Review
Section. The Trial Counsel and Defense Counsel Section would
detail counsel. The Trial Review Section would review initially all
courts-martial cases tried within the circuit. Military judges
would be designated and assigned to the judicial circuit by The
Judge Advocate General of the particular service. The judicial cir-
cuit officer would detail the military judge to individual cases.
Upon request of the convening authority, the judicial circuit officer
would detail an investigating officer not under the command of
the forwarding officer. The judicial circuit officer might disagree
with the investigating officer but if the disagreement were with
a recommendation that any charge not be referred to a general
court-martial, the judicial circuit officer would be required to
make a written report on each issue. If either the investigating
officer or the judicial circuit officer recommended against trial of
any charge by general court-martial, the convening authority, if
he disagreed, would be required to submit the charge to the Judge
Advocate General of his service for final decision. Initial review
was completely removed from the convening authority and exer-
cised by the judicial circuit officer.
Selection of court members was to be on a random basis from
courts-martial rolls. 6 3 At the request of the accused one-half of
the court membership would be comprised of enlisted personnel; at
his further request, one-half of the membership would be of the
same grade and rank as the accused.
All requests for witnesses and the production of evidence were
162. S. 2171, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
163. S. 2177, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
to be submitted to the military judge.1 64 The summary court-mar-
tial would be eliminated.16 5
Bayh and Bennett Proposals
Senator Bayh and Congressman Bennett introduced identical bills
into their respective legislative bodies.6 0 The bills provided for
sweeping changes in the military justice system. The proposals
would establish an independent courts-martial command in each
military service divided into prosecution, defense, judicial and ad-
ministrative divisions. All courts-martial would be convened by
the Chief, Administrative Division. The Chief, Prosecution Divi-
sion would refer all charges to trial. The military judge would be
given all sentencing authority, power to suspend or remit, and all
writ authority. The military judge would have the authority to
order searches and seizures of persons or property, act on all re-
quests to compel a witness to appear and testify and to compel
production of evidence. Present provisions for initial review, ac-
tion and approval by the convening authority would be repealed
under this proposal.
Any member of the armed forces on active duty for one year or
more would be eligible to serve as a member of a general or special
court-martial. Members would be selected on a random basis from
all those eligible within a geographic area. The bill would direct
a study by the existing review committee to examine the possibil-
ity of eliminating the summary court-martial.
VIIL CONCLUSION
The development of the military justice system has seen the im-
position of restrictions upon the exercise of command control of
courts-martial. Commanders may exercise control over courts-
martial by issuing policy directives, but directives cannot interfere
with the judicial processes, nor can they remove the independent
discretion of a subordinate commander. The test is whether the
directive is interpreted as mandatory by the subordinate command-
er. Attempts to limit the prosecutorial discretion of a subordinate
are merely matters of policy. Thus a policy directive concerning
military justice must be limited only to recommendations. Policy
declarations concerning discipline have been strictly construed by
the courts. That trend will continue in the future.
164. S. 2179, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
165. S. 2173, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
166. S. 1127, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R. 579, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971).
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Withdrawal or reservation of courts-martial authority is a tool
of command control. Such action may be an unlawful interference
with a convening authority's judicial acts. The legal basis for with-
drawal or reservation is questionable. To provide a clear legal
basis, a provision similar to that of the Manual must be enacted
by Congress. Absent statutory basis, the proper remedy to deal
with the incompetent convening authority seems to be his relief
from command rather than improperly divesting him of a power
granted by Congress.
The Court of Military Appeals has consistently applied the per-
sonal interest test in determining whether a convening authority
is an accuser. Thus a convening authority may be an accuser where
his orders are willfully disobeyed; but he is not an accuser where
the charge is failure to obey his order. Such a theory is a fiction
and has completely ignored the prohibition of the nominal accuser.
Strict compliance with the provisions of the Code by the court is
required to eliminate the appearance of command control. Other-
wise, the criticism that the convening authority may prefer charges
has a valid basis.
The summary court-martial is the forum most subject to com-
mand control. The amendment to the Code providing the accused
with the right to refuse trial by that court and subject himself to
the possibility of greater punishment has not removed that control.
A court in which a commander may accuse, sit in judgment and
review the same case has no place in a modern judicial system and
should be eliminated.
Command control of the detailing of court members has few re-
strictions. The court has been inclined to restrict the mode of se-
lection rather than the contents of the court membership. The
Code directs the commander to detail those members who, in his
opinion, are best qualified. To avoid the appearance of the hand-
picked court, the system of random selection should be adopted.
The simple method of drawing names from all those within a com-
mand eligible to sit on that court could be utilized. Qualities
such as age, grade and good moral character should be the govern-
ing prerequisites for eligibility. A random selection from all those
eligible within a command would result in a selection of the same
members as the present system without the convening authority
making the selection.
The use of instructions as a tool of command control has been
virtually eliminated by the Code and regulation. The use of effi-
ciency reports to control court members, defense counsel and the
military judge is prohibited. This prohibition does not apply to a
subordinate convening authority who may exercise his power in an
improper manner. The prohibition against the use of efficiency re-
ports as a tool of command control is of little practical value since
it is not difficult to find another basis for a poor rating,
Considerable command control may be exercised over the trial
counsel by use of detailed "suggestions" concerning the conduct
of his case. An order to abandon a motion to withdraw a specifica-
tion is not unlawful. Trial counsel may not be used as a vehicle
to convey command policy to members of the court.
Command control is exercised by detail of defense counsel.
This selection process is shared with the accused who may request
counsel of his own choice if reasonably available. Once counsel is
detailed he cannot be relieved at the will of the convening author-
ity or for administrative convenience.
A convening authority may return certain rulings involving
questions of law to the military judge who must accede to his view.
The commander retains judicial functions of a judge prior to detail-
ing of a military judge to a court. This procedure is not compatible
with the concept of a judiciary. These functions should be placed
in the hands of mature judges. A record of improper exercise
of judicial functions should be the basis for removal of the military
judge by the Judge Advocate General.
Command control of initial review of courts-martial gives the
commander greater judicial power than resides in any other single
judicial office. He must exercise discretion independent from pol-
icy directives of superiors or improper action by his subordinates.
An action prior to review amounting to a judgment of credibility
of witnesses will disqualify the convening authority and result in
loss of command control over review of a court-martial.
The development of the military justice system is a history of
limiting the role of command control. Although some individuals
may call for a return to systems of the past, there is no reason to
believe that development of the justice system will cease in the
future. The following comment illustrates the point:
In the military, as in the civilian community, there are those who
look backward, wistfully and longingly, to the "old ways" of hand-
ling the law breaker, and think how simple and effective life
would be if we returned to them.... Human nature being what
it is, there will probably always be those who regret the present,
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fear the future and sanctify the past. Fortunately for society, for
most of us the past is only a prologue to the present, and the pres-
ent a creative forerunner to a rewarding future.167
Command control over the military justice system has been an
area of constant criticism. Strict interpretation of statute and court
decision is a proper legal theory under which a commander and his
military attorney may operate. However, the role of criticism
should not be overshadowed by personal views. If our military
criminal system is to remain intact, commanders and military law-
yers must take the initiative. If we fail to limit the role of com-
mand control over courts-martial, it is not unlikely that Congress
will take effective action.
167. Quinn, Some Comparisons Between Courts-Martial and Civilian
Practice, 46 MiL. L. REV. 96 (1969).
